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PARAMETERIZED FAIRNESS AXIOMS
ON CYCLE-FREE GRAPH GAMES
SATOKO RYUO, KEISUKE SATO, AND YOSHITSUGU YAMAMOTO
Abstract. In this paper we study cooperative transferable utility games with communi-
cation structure represented by an undirected graph, i.e., a group of players can cooperate
only if they are connected on the graph. This type of games is called graph games and
the best-known solution for them is the Myerson value, characterized by component ef-
ficiency and fairness. Recently on cycle-free graph games, the average tree solution has
been proposed and it is characterized by component efficiency and component fairness.
We propose !-parameterized fairness that incorporates the preceding fairness axioms on
cycle-free graph games and show the existence and the uniqueness of a solution satisfying
component efficiency and our fairness for any nonnegative parameter !. We then discuss
a relationship between the existing and our proposed solutions by a numerical example.
1. Introduction
In many situations, a group of players obtain profits or save costs by their cooperation.
A subgroup of the players is called a coalition and the total profit of a coalition is called
worth of the coalition if all the members in the coalition agree to cooperate. The problem
of how much payoff should be allocated to each player then arises if we know the worth of
all possible coalitions. A classical set-valued solution is the core, see Aumann and Hart [1],
being the set of payoffs at which the worth of the whole set of players is distributed among
the players and no coalition receives less than its worth. The best-known single-valued
solution is the Shapley value, defined by Shapley [8], which is the average of all his/her
marginal contributions to every coalition that he/she is a member of.
In this paper we consider this problem with restricted cooperation structure. Restricted
cooperation means, for example, the friendship: there is no friendship between A and B,
however they can form it in the presence of C. In this case we see that C mediates between
A and B. We do not know the worth of the coalition consisting of A and B, while that
consisting of A, B and C is conceivable. This restricted cooperation structure is often
represented by undirected graphs and cooperative transferable utility games with such
structure are called graph games. Myerson [6] introduced the Myerson value for the games
and characterized it by component efficiency and fairness axioms. Myerson [7] showed
that fairness can be replaced by stronger requirement of balanced contribution. The
position value is another solution for the games proposed by Borm et al. [3]. This value
is characterized by component efficiency and balanced link contribution, which is in the
same spirit as balanced contribution, see Slikker [9]. Both the Myerson value and the
position value are based on the Shapley value. In Slikker and van den Nouweland [10]
the properties of these values are described in detail. Recently Herings et al. [5] proposed
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the average tree solution on the class of cycle-free graph games and characterized it by
component efficiency and component fairness. They also showed that the solution is in the
core if the game exhibits super-additivity, while the Myerson value or the position value
may not be. The condition of super-additivity was relaxed to a weaker one by Talman
and Yamamoto [11]. In Herings et al. [4] the average tree solution was generalized on the
whole class of graph games, however no characterization was given there.
Fairness seen in Myerson [6] means that, when a link is deleted from the underlying
graph, the two players on the ends of the link will get the same loss in payoff. Meanwhile
in Herings et al. [5], component fairness requires that the divided two components will
get the same average loss in payoff. The aim of our research is to propose a new axiom
that incorporates the preceding ones concerning fairness on cycle-free graph games. We
introduce !-parameterized fairness where ! is a nonnegative parameter, and show the
existence and the uniqueness of a solution satisfying component efficiency and our axiom
for any !. We then discuss a relationship among the existing solutions, our proposed
solutions and the core by a numerical example.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces notations of games
and undirected graphs, and then lay out graph games. In Section 3 we give the definitions
and the axioms characterizing the Myerson value and the average tree solution. The
relationship between the latter solution and the core is also presented. We propose a
new fairness axiom in Section 4 that incorporates the preceding two on cycle-free graph
games and discuss the existence and the uniqueness of a solution satisfying our axiom. In
section 5, an example of graph games by three players is given. We compute and observe
the existing solutions, our proposed solutions and the core. Section 6 concludes the paper.
2. Preliminaries
A cooperative game with transferable utility or simply a TU-game, is defined by a pair
(N, v), where N is a finite set of players, i.e., N = { 1, 2, . . . , n }, and v : 2N → R
is a characteristic function such that v(∅) = 0. The worth of a coalition S ∈ 2N is
denoted by v(S). We denote the game (N, v) by v for short and the collection of all
characteristic functions by V. A payoff vector x ∈ Rn is an n-dimensional vector, and we
let x(S) =
∑
i∈S xi for each S ∈ 2N where xi is player i’s payoff and ith component of x.
A payoff vector x of n players is said to be efficient if x(N) = v(N). A solution for games
is a mapping F : V → Rn, i.e., it returns a payoff vector when a game is input. If for any
v ∈ V it holds that ∑i∈N Fi(v) = v(N), then the solution F is said to be efficient. The
core is the classical set of efficient solutions for this type of games, see Aumann and Hart
[1]. For a game v ∈ V, the core is defined by
(2.1) C(v) := {x ∈ Rn | x(N) = v(N) and x(S) ≥ v(S) for all S ∈ 2N }.
The core is the set of payoffs which are not rejected by any coalition. The best-known
single-valued solution is the Shapley value defined by Shapley [8], and it is represented by
(2.2) ψ(v) :=
1
n!
∑
pi∈Π
mpi(v),
where mpi(v) ∈ Rn is called the marginal vector corresponding to a permutation pi and
Π is the set of all permutations on N . The ith component mpii (v) of m
pi(v) is defined as
mpii (v) := v(pi
i ∪ {i}) − v(pii) where pii = { j ∈ N | pi(j) < pi(i) }, i.e., the set of players
preceding i in permutation pi.
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Next we give several notations for undirected graphs. An undirected graph is denoted
by a pair (N,L) where N is a set of nodes and L is a set of edges, i.e., L ⊆ { {i, j} |
i, j ∈ N, i '= j }. The collection of sets of edges is denoted by L. For K ∈ 2N , the graph
(K,L(K)), where L(K) = { {i, j} | i, j ∈ K, {i, j} ∈ L }, is called the subgraph of (N,L) on
K. A sequence of edges ({i0, i1}, {i1, i2}, . . . , {il−1, il}) is a path in (N,L) if {ih, ih+1} ∈ L
for h = 0, . . . , l − 1. Two nodes i, j ∈ N are connected in (N,L) if either i = j or there
exists a path ({i0, i1}, {i1, i2}, . . . , {il−1, il}) such that i0 = i and il = j. A graph (N,L)
or simply N is connected if any two nodes i, j ∈ N are connected in (N,L). A subset
K ⊆ N is said to be a connected subset of N when the subgraph (K,L(K)) is connected.
The collection of all connected subsets of K in (K,L(K)) is denoted by C(K,L(K)), i.e.,
C(K,L(K)) := {H | H ⊆ K and H is a connected subset of K }. A subset K of N is
a component of (N,L) if K is maximally connected, i.e., K is connected but the subset
K∪{j} is not for any j ∈ N \K. The collection of all components of (K,L(K)) is denoted
by Cm(K,L(K)), i.e., Cm(K,L(K)) := {H | H ⊆ K and H is a component of K }. A
sequence of edges ({i0, i1}, {i1, i2}, . . . , {il, il+1}) is a cycle in (N,L) if
(i) l ≥ 1,
(ii) il+1 = i0, and
(iii) {ih, ih+1} ∈ L for h = 0, . . . , l.
A graph (N,L) is cycle-free if it does not contain any cycle. Here we define the collection
of sets of edges forming a cycle-free graph as M.
A graph game is given by a triple (N, v, L) whereN is a set of players, v is a characteristic
function and L is a set of edges of the graph (N,L). Omitting N , we denote the graph
game by (v, L), the collection of all graph games by V × L and that of cycle-free graph
games by V ×M. On graph games only connected subsets of the players are able to
cooperate, hence the set of admissible coalitions is C(N,L). In this paper we assume
without loss of generality that N is connected in (N,L), i.e., N ∈ C(N,L). Otherwise we
have only to discuss each component of the graph analogously. A function f : V×L→ Rn
is called a solution for graph games and fi(v, L) is called a player i’s allocation by solution
f . The core of the graph game is given by
(2.3) C(v, L) := {x ∈ Rn | x(N) = v(N) and x(S) ≥ v(S) for all S ∈ C(N,L) }.
When the graph (N,L) is complete, i.e., C(N,L) = 2N , then C(v, L) = C(v) holds and
therefore we can see (2.1) as a special case of (2.3). Moreover the core C(v, L) of the
graph game is equal to the core C(vL) where the so-called restricted game vL is defined
by Myerson [6] as
(2.4) vL(S) :=
∑
T∈Cm(S,L(S))
v(T ) for each S ∈ 2N .
3. Existing Solutions
In this section we introduce a pair of existing solutions and the axioms which character-
ize them for graph games: the Myerson value and the average tree solution. The Myerson
value is the best-known single-valued solution for graph games, defined by Myerson [6].
Definition 3.1. On the class of all graph games, the Myerson value is the Shapley value
of the restricted game defined by (2.4), i.e.,
µ(v, L) := ψ(vL).
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On the Myerson value the following two axioms are introduced, where f : V × L→ Rn
is a solution for graph games.
Axiom 3.2 (component efficiency). For any graph game (v, L) it holds that∑
i∈K
fi(v, L) = v(K) for each K ∈ Cm(N,L).
Axiom 3.3 (fairness). For any (v, L) ∈ V × L and {i, j} ∈ L, it holds that
fi(v, L)− fi(v, L \ {i, j}) = fj(v, L)− fj(v, L \ {i, j}).
Component efficiency means that the sum of the players’ allocations in a component
is equal to the worth of the component. This axiom is satisfied by all the solutions that
we introduce in this paper. Fairness means that the both players connected by an edge
obtain the same change of allocations if the edge is deleted. Myerson [6] gave the following
theorem.
Theorem 3.4 (Myerson [6]). On the class of all graph games, the Myerson value µ is the
unique solution that satisfies Axiom 3.2 and Axiom 3.3.
The average tree solution is a solution for cycle-free graph games, which is introduced
by Herings et al. [5]. To describe the solution we give here some definitions on directed
graphs, following Berge [2]. A directed graph is given by a pair (N,D) with D ⊆ N ×N ,
i.e., D is a set of ordered pairs of nodes called arcs. If (i, j) ∈ D, then we say that node j
is a successor of i and we denoted by S′D(i) the set of i’s successors. If (j, i) ∈ D, then we
say that node j is a predecessor of i and we denoted by P ′D(i) the set of i’s predecessors.
A sequence of arcs ((i0, i1), (i1.i2), . . . , (il−1, il)) is a directed path from i0 to il in (N,D)
if (ih, ih+1) ∈ D for h = 0, . . . l − 1. We say that j is a subordinate of i when there is
a directed path from i to j. The set of subordinates of i is defined by SD(i) and we let
SD(i) := SD(i) ∪ {i}. A node r is called a root if all the nodes of N \ {r} can be reached
by directed paths starting from r and a leaf is a node from which no other nodes can be
reached. Finally we define an arborescence Dr with respect to node r ∈ N as an edge set
of graph (N,Dr) such that r is a root and the other nodes have only one predecessor, i.e.,
|P ′Dr(i)| = 1 for all i ∈ N \ {r}, or in other words the graph is a rooted tree at r.
Given a cycle-free graph game (v, L), a tree solution with respect to r ∈ N , denoted by
xr, is defined as follows: make an arborescence Dr with node r as the root by giving a
direction to all the edges in L. Note that Dr is uniquely determined for any r ∈ N since
the original undirected graph (N,L) is cycle-free and we have assumed that N ∈ C(N,L).
For each node i ∈ N the ith component of tree solution xr is given by
(3.1) xri := v(SDr(i))−
∑
j∈SDr (i)
xrj .
We can determine xri inductively by (3.1) since x
r
i = v({i}) holds when i is a leaf. There
are n different tree solutions obtained and the average tree solution is defined as follows.
Definition 3.5. On the class of cycle-free graph games, the average tree solution is the
average of all tree solutions, i.e.,
AT (v, L) :=
1
n
∑
r∈N
xr.
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On the axiomatic characterization of the solution, component fairness instead of fairness
is introduced in Herings et al. [5]. Consider a solution f : V ×M → Rn for cycle-free
graph games, and for a cycle-free undirected graph (N,L) and an edge {i, j} ∈ L let Ki
and Kj be the components of (N,L \ {i, j}) containing i and j, respectively.
Axiom 3.6 (component fairness). For any (v, L) ∈ V ×M, K ∈ Cm(N,L) and {i, j} ∈
L(K), it holds that
1
|Ki|
∑
h∈Ki
(fh(v, L)− fh(v, L \ {i, j})) = 1|Kj |
∑
h∈Kj
(fh(v, L)− fh(v, L \ {i, j})).
Component fairness means that deleting the edge between two nodes yields the same
average loss in payoff between the divided two components. Herings et al. [5] gives the
following result.
Theorem 3.7 (Herings et al. [5]). On the class of cycle-free graph games, the average tree
solution AT is the unique solution that satisfies Axiom 3.2 and Axiom 3.6.
They also discuss the relationship between the average tree solution and the core of
graph games. A graph game is said to be super-additive if
v(S ∪ T ) ≥ v(S) + v(T )
holds for all S, T ∈ C(N,L) such that S ∩ T = ∅ and S ∪ T ∈ C(N,L). They show
that tree solution xr is one of the extreme points of the core for any r on super-additive
cycle-free graph games. Hence the average tree solution is in the core of the graph game,
i.e., AT (v, L) ∈ C(v, L), while the Myerson value is not always.
4. Parameterized Fairness Axiom and Existence of Solution
This section presents a new axiom on fairness that incorporates the preceding ones on
cycle-free graph games and shows the existence and the uniqueness of a solution satisfying
component efficiency and our fairness. Concerning the equations appearing in Axiom 3.3
and Axiom 3.6, we focus on the difference of the coefficient of each fh(v, L). Fairness
requires the distribution of loss in payoff between player i and j caused by the deletion
of edge {i, j}. In other words, the loss coefficient is one for i and j and zero for the rest
of the players. It is natural to think that all the players should accept a certain amount
of loss. Component fairness distributes the loss among the whole players in this sense.
The loss coefficients are all identical among the players in the same component, 1/|Ki|
or 1/|Kj | according to the component that he/she belongs to. It seems, however, unfair
that a player away from the deleted edge is given the same loss coefficient as a player close
to the edge. Therefore we propose here a new fairness axiom under which the coefficient
varies according to the distance from the deleted edge by introducing one nonnegative
parameter !. We name it !-parameterized fairness.
Axiom 4.1 (!-parameterized fairness). For any (v, L) ∈ V ×M, K ∈ Cm(N,L) and
{i, j} ∈ L(K), it holds that
1∑
h∈Ki
!τ
i(h)
∑
h∈Ki
!τ
i(h)(fh(v, L)− fh(v, L \ {i, j}))
=
1∑
h∈Kj
!τ
j(h)
∑
h∈Kj
!τ
j(h)(fh(v, L)− fh(v, L \ {i, j})),
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where τ i(h) is defined as follows: for component Ki make an arborescence Di with node
i as the root and set
τ i(h) :=
{
0 if P ′Di(h) = ∅,
1 + τ i(k) with {k} = P ′Di(h) otherwise.
The function τ i(h) is the depth of node h on the arborescence with i as the root, and
the loss coefficient of a node is ! times that of his/her predecessor. Hence for ! < 1 the
coefficient of a player is relatively high if he/she is close to the deleted edge, while that
of another is low if he/she is far from it. Each coefficient is normalized so that the sum
of the coefficients in the same component is to be one. If we set ! either to 0 or to 1 we
obtain the preceding axioms.
Corollary 4.2. In Axiom 4.1, if we set ! = 0 then we obtain Axiom 3.3 1 for L ∈M and
if we set ! = 1 then we obtain Axiom 3.6.
The following theorem shows the existence and the uniqueness of the solution satisfying
component efficiency and !-parameterized fairness.
Theorem 4.3. On the class of cycle-free graph games, for any ! ≥ 0 there exists a unique
solution that satisfies Axiom 3.2 and Axiom 4.1.
Given a cycle-free connected graph (N,L), we create, from the one equation appearing
in Axiom 3.2 and the (n − 1) equations appearing in Axiom 4.1, the following equality
system
Af(v, L) = b
where the matrix A ∈ Rn×n consists of the coefficients of fh(v, L)s’, and b ∈ Rn consists of
v(K) and the terms of fh(v, L\{i, j})s’. Note that each column of the matrix corresponds
to the index of the nodes and each row corresponds to the deleted edge in Axiom 4.1 except
for that on component efficiency. For inductive proof we assume that f(v, L\{i, j}) exists
and accordingly b is a constant.2 We show that the system has a unique solution by
proving that
Ac = 0
holds for c ∈ Rn if and only if c = 0. We see here an element ci of c correspond to node
i. On the cycle-free graph we choose one arbitrary root node and make an arborescence
D as we do to define a tree solution in Section 3. We present two lemmas concerning the
elements of c between connected nodes.
Lemma 4.4. Let j1 and j2 be siblings whose parent is i, i.e., {i} = P ′D(j1) = P ′D(j2). If
cj1 = cp for all p ∈ SD(j1) and cj2 = cq for all q ∈ SD(j1), then cj1 = cj2.
Proof. Let H = N \ (SD(j1) ∪ SD(j2)). The corresponding equation for row {j1, i} in
Ac = 0 is, from Kj1 = SD(j1), Ki = H ∪ SD(j2) and our assumption,
1× cj1 −
∑
h∈H
!τ
i(h)ch +
∑
q∈SD(j2)
!τ
i(q)cj2∑
h∈H
!τ
i(h) +
∑
q∈SD(j2)
!τ
i(q)
= 0,
1We regard 00 as 1.
2For fh(v, L˜) with |L˜| = 1 it clearly holds that fh(v,∅) = v(h).
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which is equivalently
(4.1) (
∑
h∈H
!τ
i(h) +
∑
q∈SD(j2)
!τ
i(q))cj1 −
∑
h∈H
!τ
i(h)ch −
∑
q∈SD(j2)
!τ
i(q)cj2 = 0.
For row {j2, i} we analogously have
(4.2) (
∑
h∈H
!τ
i(h) +
∑
p∈SD(j1)
!τ
i(p))cj2 −
∑
h∈H
!τ
i(h)ch −
∑
p∈SD(j1)
!τ
i(p)cj1 = 0.
By subtracting (4.2) from (4.1) we obtain
(
∑
h∈H
!τ
i(h) +
∑
q∈SD(j2)
!τ
i(q) +
∑
p∈SD(j1)
!τ
i(p))cj1
− (
∑
h∈H
!τ
i(h) +
∑
p∈SD(j1)
!τ
i(p) +
∑
q∈SD(j2)
!τ
i(q))cj2 = 0
and see that cj1 = cj2 . !
Lemma 4.5. Let i be a node who has child j, i.e., j ∈ S′D(i). If cj = ck for all k ∈ SD(i),
then ci = cj.
Proof. When i is the root, the values of the nodes other than i are all cj by the assumption.
The equation for row {j, i} is then
1× cj − 1
!0 +
∑
h∈Ki\{i}
!τ
i(h)
(!0ci +
∑
h∈Ki\{i}
!τ
i(h)cj) = 0
and it immediately holds that ci = cj .
When i is not the root node, let G = N \ SD(i) and the equation for row {j, i} is, from
Kj = SD(j) and Ki = {i} ∪ (SD(i) \ SD(j)) ∪G,
1× cj −
!0ci +
∑
h∈SD(i)\SD(j)
!τ
i(h)cj +
∑
g∈G
!τ
i(g)cg
!0 +
∑
h∈SD(i)\SD(j)
!τ
i(h) +
∑
g∈G
!τ
i(g)
= 0,
which is equivalently
(4.3) (!0 +
∑
g∈G
!τ
i(g))cj − !0ci −
∑
g∈G
!τ
i(g)cg = 0.
Next let m be the parent of i and consider the equation for row {i,m}. Since Ki =
{i} ∪ SD(i) and Km = G in this case, we see that
!0ci +
∑
h∈SD(i)
!τ
i(h)cj
!0 +
∑
h∈SD(i)
!τ
i(h)
−
∑
g∈G
!τ
m(g)cg∑
g∈G
!τ
m(g)
= 0.
Since !τm(g) = !τ i(g)−1 for g ∈ G, it is equivalent to
(4.4) (
∑
g∈G
!τ
i(g)−1)(!0ci +
∑
h∈SD(i)
!τ
i(h)cj)− (!0 +
∑
h∈SD(i)
!τ
i(h))(
∑
g∈G
!τ
i(g)−1cg) = 0.
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Figure 5.1. Example
By row operation (!0 +
∑
h∈SD(i) !
τ i(h))× (4.3)− !× (4.4), we have
(!0 +
∑
h∈SD(i)
!τ
i(h))((!0 +
∑
g∈G
!τ
i(g))cj − !0ci)− (
∑
g∈G
!τ
i(g))(!0ci +
∑
h∈SD(i)
!τ
i(h)cj)
= (!0 +
∑
h∈SD(i)
!τ
i(h) +
∑
g∈G
!τ
i(g))cj − (!0 +
∑
h∈SD(i)
!τ
i(h) +
∑
g∈G
!τ
i(g))ci = 0
and hence ci = cj . !
Proof of Theorem 4.9. By applying Lemma 4.4 and Lemma 4.5 alternately from the leaves
to the root on the tree, we see that ci = cj for all i, j ∈ N . Since the system Ac = 0
includes the equation
∑
i∈N ci = 0 corresponding to Axiom 3.2, we have c = 0 and
conclude the proof. !
We call this unique solution the !-parameterized solution. The whole set of the solutions
consisting of those for all ! ≥ 0 incorporates the Myerson value and the average tree
solution by Corollary 4.2. Note that, on the class of graph games containing cycles, i.e.,
(v, L) ∈ V × (L \M), the uniqueness of a solution satisfying Axiom 3.2 and Axiom 3.3
is, if exists, is shown by Theorem 4.3. We choose, among all the equations consisting of
the axioms, component efficiency equations and fairness ones for the edges forming an
arbitrary tree. A unique solution exists for such system of equalities and the rest of them
do not extend the feasible region.
5. Examples
We will give an example of graph games and compare the solutions in the preceding
sections. The graph consists of N = {1, 2, 3} and L = {{1, 2}, {2, 3}}, see Figure 5.1. The
characteristic function is given by
v({1}) = v({2}) = v({3}) = 0,
v({1, 2}) = 0.8,
v({2, 3}) = 0.9,
v({1, 2, 3}) = 1.
Note that this example satisfies super-additivity. The core of this game is given by
x1, x2, x3 ≥ 0,
x1 + x2 ≥ 0.8,
x2 + x3 ≥ 0.9,
x1 + x2 + x3 = 1.
The tree solutions xr for r = 1, 2 and 3, the Myerson value µ and the average tree solution
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Figure 5.2. Core and existing solutions
AT are displayed in Table 5.1. For example, the tree solution x3 is derived from
x31 = v(∅) = 0,
x32 = v({1, 2})− x31 = 0.8,
x33 = v({1, 2, 3})− x32 = 0.2.
We also plot the position of these solutions on the triangular graph, see Figure 5.2. We
observe that the tree solutions are some extreme points of the core and the average tree
solution is in it, while the Myerson value is out of it.
Table 5.2 and Figure 5.3 show the !-parameterized solutions for various value of !
between 0 and 1. We obtain the Myerson value for ! = 0 and the average tree solution for
! = 1. We observe that the !-parameterized solutions lie between the Myerson value and
the average tree solution since the !-parameterized solution a solution of linear algebraic
equations and therefore is a continuous function of !. In particular our solutions are in the
core when ! ≥ (1 +√237)/34 ≈ 0.515. The average tree solution is in the convex hull of
the tree solutions by its nature on super-additive games. In contrast the !-parameterized
Table 5.1. Existing solutions
tree solution
x1 x2 x3 µ AT
node 1 0.100 0.000 0.000 0.167 0.033
node 2 0.900 1.000 0.800 0.617 0.900
node 3 0.000 0.000 0.200 0.217 0.067
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Figure 5.3. !-parameterized solutions
solutions can be out of this convex hull but lie in the left half of the core when (1 +√
237)/34 ≤ ! ≤ (3 + 8√2)/17 ≈ 0.842. Note that our solutions do not lie on the straight
line connecting the Myerson value and the average tree solution. The solution for ! = 0.5
is not the midpoint between ! = 0 and ! = 1.
6. Conclusion
In this paper a new solution for cycle-free graph games is presented in contrast to the
Myerson value proposed by Myerson [6] and to the average tree solution by Herings et al.
[5]. The Myerson value is characterized by component efficiency and fairness while the
average tree solution by component efficiency and component fairness. We propose !-
parameterized fairness where ! is a parameter on the distribution of loss in payoff among
players. It corresponds to fairness when ! = 0 and component fairness when ! = 1, hence
our fairness axiom incorporates the preceding axioms. We show the existence and the
uniqueness of a solution satisfying component efficiency and !-parameterized fairness for
any nonnegative !. We call such a solution the !-parameterized solution.
A numerical example of a three-person super-additive graph game is exhibited and the
existing and our solutions are displayed visually. Starting from the Myerson value which
is out of the core in the example, the !-parameterized solution moves on the triangular
graph as ! increases and reaches the average tree solution lying on the convex hull of some
extreme points of the core. It intersects the core and the convex hull of the tree solutions
on its way since the !-parameterized solution is a continuous function on !. Our solutions,
however, do not lie on the straight line connecting the two preceding solutions.
Table 5.2. !-parameterized solutions
! 0.0 0.3 0.5 0.515 0.6 0.8 0.842 1.0
node 1 0.167 0.129 0.102 0.100 0.088 0.061 0.055 0.033
node 2 0.617 0.702 0.758 0.763 0.787 0.843 0.855 0.900
node 3 0.217 0.169 0.140 0.137 0.125 0.096 0.009 0.067
PARAMETERIZED FAIRNESS AXIOMS ON CYCLE-FREE GRAPH GAMES 11
References
[1] R.J. Aumann and S. Hart, editors. Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications,
volume 1. North-Holland, 1992.
[2] C. Berge. Graphs and Hypergraphs. North-Holland, 1973.
[3] P. Borm, G. Owen, and S. Tijs. On the position value for communication situations. SIAM
Journal on Discrete Mathematics, 5(3):305–320, 1992.
[4] P.J.J. Herings, G. van der Laan, D. Talman, and Z. Yang. The average tree solution for
cooperative games with communication structure. Games and Economic Behavior (to appear).
[5] P.J.J. Herings, G. van der Laan, and D. Talman. The average tree solution for cycle-free graph
games. Games and Economic Behavior, 62(1):77–92, 2008.
[6] R.B. Myerson. Graphs and cooperation in games. Mathematics of Operations Research, 2(3):
225–229, 1977.
[7] R.B. Myerson. Conference structures and fair allocation rules. International Journal of Game
Theory, 9(3):169–182, 1980.
[8] L.S. Shapley. A value for n-person games. In H.W. Kuhn and A.W. Tucker, editors, Con-
tributions to the Theory of Games, volume 2, pages 307–317. Princeton University Press,
1953.
[9] M. Slikker. A characterization of the position value. International Journal of Game Theory,
33(4):505–514, 2005.
[10] M. Slikker and A. van den Nouweland. Social and Economic Networks in Cooperative Game
Theory. Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2001.
[11] D. Talman and Y. Yamamoto. Average tree solution and subcore for acyclic graph games.
Journal of the Operations Research Society of Japan, 51(3):203–212, 2008.
Satoko Ryuo, Keisuke Sato, Transport Information Technology Division, Railway Tech-
nical Research Institute
E-mail address: keisato@rtri.or.jp, ryuo@rtri.or.jp
Yoshitsugu Yamamoto, Graduate School of Systems and Information Engineering, Uni-
versity of Tsukuba
E-mail address: yamamoto@sk.tsukuba.ac.jp
